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ABSTRACT
Passwords are undoubtedly the most dominant user authentication
mechanism on the web today. Although they are inexpensive and
easy-to-use, security concerns of password-based authentication
are serious. Phishing and theft of password databases are two crit-
ical concerns. The tendency of users to re-use passwords across
different services exacerbates the impact of these two concerns.
Current solutions addressing these concerns are not fully satisfac-
tory: they typically address only one of the two concerns; they
do not protect passwords from rogue servers; they do not provide
any verifiable evidence of their (server-side) adoption to users; and
they face deployability challenges in terms of the cost for service
providers and/or ease-of-use for end users.
We present SafeKeeper, a comprehensive approach to protect the
confidentiality of passwords in web authentication systems. Unlike
previous approaches, SafeKeeper protects user passwords against
very strong adversaries, including rogue servers and sophisticated
external phishers. It is relatively inexpensive to deploy as it (i) uses
widely available hardware securitymechanisms like Intel SGX, (ii) is
integrated into popular web platforms like WordPress, and (iii) has
small performance overhead. We describe a variety of challenges
in designing and implementing such a system, and how we over-
come them. Through an 86-participant user study, and systematic
analysis and experiments, we demonstrate the usability, security
and deployability of SafeKeeper, which is available as open-source.
1 INTRODUCTION
Passwords are by far the most widely used primary authentication
mechanism on the web. Although many alternative schemes have
been proposed, none has yet challenged the dominance of pass-
words. In the evaluation framework of authentication mechanisms
by Bonneau et al. [10], passwords have the best overall usability,
since they are easy to understand, efficient to use, and don’t require
the user to carry additional devices/tokens. They also excel in terms
of deployability, since they are compatible with virtually all servers
and web browsers, incur minimal cost per user, and are accessible,
mature, and non-proprietary. However, in terms of security, pass-
words are currently a comparatively poor choice. The two most
critical security concerns, leading to the compromise of a large
number of passwords, include: (i) phishing of passwords from users,
and (ii) password database breaches from servers.
Phishing attacks are prevalent in the wild, affecting home and
business users alike (cf. APWG [2], PhishTank [35]), and increas-
ingly using TLS certificates from browser-trusted CAs (see e.g. [33]).
While advanced anti-phishing solutions exist [13, 31], and will im-
prove over time, they alone cannot address the password confi-
dentiality problem adequately, because users may unknowingly
or inadvertently disclose passwords to malicious servers, which
can then use the collected passwords at other servers. Note that
an estimated 43–51% of users reuse passwords across different ser-
vices [15] (see also more recent reuse analyses [23, 25, 44]).
Password database breaches are increasingly frequent: hundreds
of millions of passwords have been leaked in recent years (see
e.g. [17, 36]). Users are completely powerless against such breaches.
Password breaches are commonly dealt with by asking users to
quickly reset their passwords, which is not very effective [24]. Ex-
pecting users to select a different strong password for every site is
unrealistic [32], and thus widespread password reuse makes these
breaches problematic beyond the sites where the actual leak oc-
curred [25]. Stolen passwords can also lead to large-scale breaches
of privacy/security sensitive data [43]. Several recent solutions
(e.g. [5, 11, 19, 30]) have been proposed to address password data-
base breaches. Some of them (e.g. [5, 11, 30]) make use of hardware-
based trusted execution environments (TEEs) on the server side, but
none can protect password confidentiality against rogue servers (i.e.
compromised servers, or servers belonging to malicious operators).
Designing effective solutions to protect passwords against rogue
servers poses multiple technical challenges in terms of security
(How to hide passwords from the authenticating server itself? How
to rate-limit password testing by the server?); usability (How to
minimize the burden on users? How to support login from diverse
user devices?); user-verifiability (How to notify users when the
solution is active?); performance (How to realize this at scale?);
and deployability (How to allow easy/inexpensive integration with
popular website frameworks?). Bonneau et al. [10] observed: “many
academic proposals have failed to gain traction because researchers
rarely consider a sufficiently wide range of real-world constraints”.
We present SafeKeeper, a comprehensive system for protecting
password confidentiality in web services. Unlike all previous propos-
als, SafeKeeper defends against both phishing and password database
theft, even in the case of rogue servers. At its core, SafeKeeper relies
on a server-side password protection service that computes a keyed
one-way function on the passwords before they are stored in the
database. This service is protected by a server-side TEE, which
isolates the service from all other software on the server. SafeKeeper
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includes a novel rate-limitingmechanism to throttle online guessing
attacks at a rogue server.
SafeKeeper’s client-side functionality, which is implemented as
a web browser addon, enables end users to detect whether a web
server is running the SafeKeeper password protection service within
a server-side TEE, and to establish a secure channel from their
browsers directly to it. This mechanism assures a user that it is safe
to enter the password as it will be accessible only to the SafeKeeper
password protection service on the server. Unlike other client-side
assurance approaches that rely on reliably identifying servers (e.g.
by checking URLs or TLS certificates), or verifying their expected
functionality, our approach relies only on signaling users via the
SafeKeeper browser addon, and thereby allowing them to correctly
identify the server-side code that will process the password. As long
as users correctly recognize SafeKeeper’s client-side signaling, and
enter their passwords only to SafeKeeper-enabled web servers, confi-
dentiality of their password is guaranteed, even if users mistook the
identity of the server (e.g. phishing), or the server is malicious/compro-
mised (rogue server). As such, SafeKeeper may present a significant
shift in phishing avoidance and password protection.
Our design considers deployability as a primary objective. We
demonstrate this by developing a fully-functional implementation
of SafeKeeper using Intel’s recent Software Guard Extensions (SGX),
and integrating this with minimal software changes into PHPass,
the password hashing framework used in popular platforms like
WordPress, Joomla, and Drupal, which as of April 2018 accounted
for over 35% of the Alexa top 10-million websites [40]. SafeKeeper’s
client-end functionality does not depend on any additional de-
vice/service/hardware feature, and thus can be implemented in
most user devices/OSes, including smartphones. Our implementa-
tion is available as open-source software [29].
Our contribution is SafeKeeper, including its:
• Design: As a password-protection scheme featuring
– a server-side password protection service using off-the-
shelf trusted hardware to protect users’ passwords, even against
rogue servers (Sections 4.1–4.3), and
– a novel client-side assurancemechanism allowing users to
easily determine if it is safe to enter passwords on a web page
(Section 4.4). Our mechanism relies only on verifying whether
the server runs SafeKeeper without having to verify the server’s
identity or correct behavior.
• Implementation and integration: A full open-source imple-
mentation of (i) server-side functionality using Intel SGX, and in-
tegration into PHPass to support several popular web platforms,
and (ii) client-side functionality realized as a Google Chrome
browser addon (Section 5).
• Analysis and evaluation: A comprehensive analysis of secu-
rity guarantees (Section 6.1), an experimental evaluation of per-
formance (Section 6.3), deployability in real-world platforms
(Section 6.4), and validation of effectiveness of the client-side as-
surance mechanism via an 86-participant user study (Section 6.2).
• Extensions and variations: Several extensions and enhance-
ments for providing backup and recovery mechanisms, scaling
to multiple servers, and protecting email addresses (and poten-
tially most other privacy-sensitive identity tokens) in addition to
passwords (Section 7).
2 PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Storing Passwords
The current best-practice for storing passwords is for the server to
compute a one-way function on the password (e.g. a cryptographic
hash), and store only the result in the database. When the user
logs in, the supplied password is passed through the same one-way
function and compared to the value in the database. Although an
adversary who obtains the database cannot reverse the one-way
function, he can guess candidate passwords and apply the same one-
way function in order to test his guesses. Since passwords are not
strong secrets (e.g. compared to cryptographic keys), this type of
brute force guessing attack is often feasible. The adversary can even
speed up this attack using rainbow tables – pre-computed tables of
hashed passwords. If multiple users choose the same password, the
results of the one-way function would also be the same.
To prevent the use of rainbow tables and avoid revealing dupli-
cate passwords, it is customary to use a salt – a random number
unique to each user that is concatenated with the password before
being hashed. However, since salt values are stored in the database,
an adversary who obtains this database can still mount brute-force
password guessing attacks against specific users by concatenating
his guesses with the corresponding salt values.
Another layer of defence is to also use a pepper [7] – a random
value included in every password hash but not stored in the pass-
word database. The pepper is usually the same for each user e.g.
Dropbox uses a global pepper to protect their users’ passwords [18].
Without knowing the pepper value, the adversary cannot test pass-
word guesses against a stolen database. Therefore, the challenge
is to protect the pepper from an adversary (who may compromise
the server) whilst still being able to use it when users log in. For
example, Dropbox has indicated [18] that in future they may store
the pepper in a hardware security module (HSM).
2.2 Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs)
A TEE provides isolated execution for security-sensitive code. Code
running within the TEE (Trusted Applications, TAs) has exclusive
access to data held within the TEE. A recent example is Intel’s
Software Guard Extensions (SGX).
2.2.1 Intel Software Guard Extensions. SGX is a set of CPU
extensions available on the Skylake processor microarchitecture
and onwards.1 The new SGX instructions allow a userspace ap-
plication to establish a hardware-enforced TEE, called an enclave.
The enclave runs in the application’s virtual address space, but
after it has been initialized, only the code inside the enclave is
allowed to access enclave data. The application can call enclave
functions (called ecalls) via well-defined entry points. Enclave
data is stored in a special region of memory, called the Enclave
Page Cache (EPC), which can only be accessed by the CPU. When
any enclave data leaves the CPU (e.g. is written to DRAM), it is
encrypted and integrity-protected, using a key accessible only to
the CPU [22]. The enclave’s data is therefore protected against
privileged software (including the OS/hypervisor), and hardware
attacks (e.g. snooping on the memory bus).
1https://software.intel.com/en-us/sgx
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During enclave initialization, the CPU measures the enclave’s
code and configuration, which constitute the enclave’s identity (i.e.
its MRENCLAVE value). The enclave can seal data by encrypting it
with a CPU-protected key that can only be accessed from enclaves
running on the same CPUwith precisely the same MRENCLAVE value.
2.2.2 SGX Remote Attestation. Remote attestation is the process
through which one party, the verifier, can ascertain the precise
hardware and software configuration of a remote party, the prover.
The objective is to provide the verifier with sufficient information
to make a trust decision about the prover.
SGX supports remote attestation by having verifiers rely on the
Intel Attestation Service (IAS) to validate attestation evidence pro-
duced by a remote prover enclave [1]. The SGX SDK includes a
pre-defined set of functions to run a remote attestation protocol.
This default protocol is designed for a service provider to provision
secrets to an enclave, and as such, the service provider is authenti-
cated by the enclave as part of the protocol.
The protocol starts with the verifier sending a challenge to the
enclave. The enclave generates an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman (DH)
key pair and sends the public key to the verifier. The verifier con-
tacts the IAS to retrieve a signature revocation list (SigRL), which
is needed to prove that the platform has not been revoked. The
SigRL does not have to be fetched in every run of the protocol, but
must be sufficiently recent for the attestation to be verified. The
verifier generates its own DH key pair and sends the public key to
the enclave, signed with the verifier’s long-term key. The verifier’s
long-term public key is hardcoded into the enclave to allow the
enclave to authenticate the verifier. Thus the enclave should be
aware of all verifiers that will be able to attest the enclave. SGX
then produces a quote of the enclave, which includes a hash of both
public keys and a key derived from the common secret. In this way
the quote unambiguously identifies the enclave and cryptographi-
cally binds the public key to this enclave. Finally, the quote is sent
to the verifier, who uses the IAS to validate the quote. The response
from the IAS is signed by an Intel public key.
3 SYSTEM MODEL AND REQUIREMENTS
3.1 Overview
We use the term password to refer to any user-memorized authenti-
cation secret. As explained in Section 2, passwords are generally
weak secrets (e.g. 20 bits of entropy [9]) that are re-used across
multiple services. Figure 1 is a generalized model of a password-
based authentication system. With the assistance of client-side
software (e.g. a web browser), a user sends her user ID and pass-
word to a server over a secure channel (TLS), and based on this, the
server makes an authentication decision. Although real systems
are undoubtedly more complicated, they can all be logically repre-
sented as the model in Figure 1. Therefore, for clarity of exposition
and without loss of generality, we use this model and terminology
throughout this paper.
Confidentiality of user passwords may be compromised in mul-
tiple ways, including:
• Users disclose a password directly to the adversary under the mis-
taken impression that the password is being sent to the intended
service (e.g. phishing attacks).
Figure 1: Generalized model of a password-based authenti-
cation system.
• Information about the password, or the password itself, is leaked
from the server (e.g. stolen password database).
• Compromise of the server itself (e.g. a web server memory snoop-
ing).
Any comprehensive solution for protecting passwords must de-
fend against all these different attack avenues.
3.2 Adversary Model
The goal of our adversary is to learn users’ plaintext passwords. Our
adversary model is stronger than that of previous solutions – we
allow for the possibility that the adversary may have the capabilities
of the operator (owner/administrator) of the web server itself. This
covers both compromised web servers, as well as malicious server
operators (for clarity of exposition, we use the term rogue server
to refer to both of these). The widespread practice of reusing the
same or similar passwords across services provides the incentive
for the adversary to learn plaintext passwords, which they can then
abuse in different ways, including (i) masquerading as the user on a
different service, where the user may have used the same or similar
password; (ii) accessing user data encrypted by a password-derived
key (e.g. for encrypted cloud storage services, especially, if forced
legally or illegally); and (iii) selling/leaking user passwords to other
malicious entities.
Concretely, we allow the adversary the following capabilities,
covering rogue servers and weaker external adversaries:
Access password database: the adversary has unrestricted ac-
cess to the database of stored passwords. This models both rogue
servers and weaker external adversaries who may steal the pass-
word database.
Modify web content: the adversary can arbitrarily modify the
content sent to the user (including active content such as client-
side scripts). This also models weaker external adversaries who can
modify content using attacks such as cross-site scripting (XSS).
Access to server-client communication: the adversary can
read all content sent to the web server, including content encrypted
by a TLS session key. For a rogue server, such access is easily
obtained, and for external network adversaries, such access could
be obtained through successful attacks against TLS (e.g. [4, 38]).
Execute server-side code: the adversary has full knowledge of
all software running on the server, and is able to execute arbitrary
software on the server. This captures a powerful attacker who
successfully gains access and escalates privileges on the server, or
a malicious server operator.
Launch phishing attacks: the adversary can launch state-of-
the-art phishing attacks, including targeted attacks.
We assume that the adversary cannot compromise the client-side
software, including the user’s OS and browser, but the adversary
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can send any content to the client. Although client-side security is
important, it is an orthogonal problem and is thus out of the scope
of this work. It is addressed by other means, such as client-side
platform security, use of anti-malware tools etc. Our focus in this
paper is how password-based authentication systems can be made
resilient against strong server-side adversaries.
We assume that the adversary is computationally bounded, and
thus cannot feasibly subvert correctly-implemented cryptographic
primitives. We also assume that the adversary does not have suf-
ficient resources to subvert the security guarantees of hardware-
based TEEs through direct physical attacks.We discuss side-channel
attacks specific to SGX in Section 6.1, including some counter-
measures. Denial of service (DoS) attacks are out of scope because
a rogue server can always mount a DoS attack by simply refusing
to respond to requests.
3.3 Requirements and Objectives
Given our strong adversary model, a full server compromise could
undoubtedly cause significant damage (e.g. theft, loss, or modifica-
tion of user information). Our aim is to guarantee that even such
a compromise will not leak users’ passwords. This is a valuable
security guarantee because passwords are re-used across multiple
services, and sometimes used to derive keys to encrypt content
stored in the cloud.
Guaranteeing password confidentiality mitigates attacks on the
server and password databases, but not phishing attacks. Thus we
also need to provide users with the means to easily and effectively
determine when it is safe to enter their passwords. Therefore, we
define the following two formal requirements for a comprehensive
solution for protecting a password-based authentication system:
R1 Password protection: The server must protect users’ pass-
words by fulfilling all the following criteria:
(i) The strong adversary defined above cannot obtain users’
passwords through any means other than guessing (e.g. he
cannot observe passwords in transit or while they are being
processed on the server).
(ii) Offline password guessing must be computationally infeasi-
ble, irrespective of the strength of the password.
(iii) Online password guessing must be throttled, irrespective of
the adversary’s computational capabilities.
R2 User awareness: End users must be able to easily and accu-
rately determine whether it is safe to enter their passwords
when prompted by a given server (i.e. indirectly determine
whether the server fulfils Requirement R1).
Note that Requirement R2 does not mandate users to understand
the precise technical security guarantees of Requirement R1, but
rather that the solution should enable users to determine which
servers meet this requirement, and will thus protect passwords.
In order to be effective, any solution for protecting passwords
must be deployable in real-world systems. Therefore, in addition to
the above two security requirements, we also target the following
deployment objectives:
Minimal performance overhead: The solution should not no-
ticeably degrade the performance of password-based authentication
systems, either in terms of latency (the time required to complete
a single authentication attempt), or scalability (the overall rate at
which authentication attempts can be evaluated).
Minimal software changes: It should be possible to integrate
the solution into a wide range of existing software systems without
requiring significant effort.
Ease of upgrade: It should be possible to upgrade existing
password-based authentication systems to adopt the solution trans-
parently (e.g. without immediately mandating users to reset their
passwords). Existing mechanisms for changing/resetting passwords
should also remain unaffected.
Backup and recovery: The solution should include a secure
backup and recovery mechanism to ensure that it can continue
operating in the event of (multiple) hardware failures.
4 DESIGN
Figure 2: Overview of the SafeKeeper design.
As shown in Figure 2, SafeKeeper consists of a server-side password
protection service, which computes a keyed one-way function on
passwords before they are stored in the database. An adversary
must obtain the key (i.e. pepper) used in this one-way function to
launch feasible offline guessing attacks against a stolen password
database. This key is randomly generated, and of sufficient length
(e.g. 128 bits) to defeat brute-force attacks. We refer to this key as
the SafeKey, since it is generated and protected by a server-side
Trusted Application (TA, executing within the TEE); see Section 4.1.
With direct access to the password protection service, an un-
trusted server operator or an adversary who has compromised the
server can also perform online password guessing attacks. In this
case, the adversary supplies a guessed password, and the password
protection service returns the processed result, which the adversary
can compare with the stored password value. To defend against
this attack, the password protection service must limit the rate at
which it processes passwords. SafeKeeper achieves this by enforcing
rate limiting in the TEE; see Section 4.2.
Furthermore, the rogue server may attempt to observe passwords
before they are sent to the password protection service. A secure
channel between the web browser addon and the server (e.g. a TLS
connection) is insufficient as the server-end of such a connection
is controlled by the server operator. Instead, SafeKeeper establishes
a separate secure channel directly between the browser and the
TEE-protected password protection service; see Section 4.3. Finally,
the browser needs some way to determine which input data should
be sent via this secure channel to the password protection service
(e.g. passwords but not user IDs). To improve usability, the server
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operator defines which input fields will be protected, and then the
SafeKeeper browser addon displays this information to the user. The
user is thus only required to validate that the password field is
protected; see Section 4.4.
4.1 Server-side Password Protection
The SafeKeeper password protection service (SafeKeeper TA) is de-
signed to be a drop-in replacement for existing one-way functions
(e.g. password hash algorithms). As such, it takes as input the con-
catenation of the password and the corresponding salt value, and
outputs the result of a keyed one-way function, which the server
stores in its database. To protect the SafeKey used in this function,
SafeKeeper computes the one-way function inside a server-side TEE.
The TEE provides strong isolation (e.g. hardware-enforced) from
all other software on the server (including the OS/hypervisor), and
thus ensures that the SafeKey is available only to the TA code.
Even if an adversary obtains the password database, he cannot per-
form an offline password guessing attack because he would need
the SafeKey to test his guesses against the database. Since offline
attacks are no longer possible, SafeKeeper can use any cryptograph-
ically secure one-way function, i.e. specifically-designed password
hash functions (e.g. Argon2 [6]) are not essential (but can be used).
The adversary is thus forced to try online guessing attacks, which
are mitigated by SafeKeeper’s rate-limiting mechanism.
4.2 Rate Limiting
Ideally, the password protection service should perform rate lim-
iting on a per-account basis to: (i) protect each account password,
and (ii) avoid rate-limiting a user due to the actions of other users.
Note that, in order to serve as a drop-in replacement in existing
authentication frameworks, the SafeKeeper TA only computes the
keyed one-way function, but does not make or learn the authenti-
cation decision. In other words, it cannot distinguish between the
two scenarios: (i) when the user account is under guessing attack,
and (ii) when a legitimate user is attempting to login multiple times
within a short period of time (with or without a valid password).
Also, as the function does not take the user ID as input, we cannot
implement user ID based rate limiting. Changing the function to
include user IDs as input would require non-trivial changes to the
server software, limiting SafeKeeper’s use as a drop-in replacement.
As a work-around, we rate limit each account using the unique
per-account salt values, which are provided to the one-way func-
tion as part of regular operation. It is general security best-practice
to use unique salt values for each account, but if a server opera-
tor chooses the same salt for multiple (or all) accounts, he only
restricts his own guessing capability. Furthermore, since the salt
is a fixed pre-determined length, the adversary cannot perform a
type-substitution attack by providing a salt of a different length,
e.g. concatenating the first few characters of a guessed password
with the salt value.
SafeKeeper limits password processing for each account (salt)
based on a quantized maximum rate. Simply enforcing a maximum
rate (e.g. waiting 10 minutes between password attempts) would
negatively impact usability in cases where the user mistyped a
password. Instead, the quantized maximum rate allows a fixed
number of attempts within a pre-defined time interval, but doesn’t
mandate a delay between these attempts. For example, each user
could be allowed 144 attempts that could be used at any time within
each 24-hour period. After exhausting these attempts, the user
has to wait until the following time period, when the count is
reset. Overall, this results in the same rate as waiting 10 minutes
between guesses, but significantly improves usability whenmultiple
attempts are required in quick succession.
4.3 Remote Attestation
To securely transmit a user password, the SafeKeeper browser addon
must correctly authenticate the SafeKeeper password protection ser-
vice (SafeKeeper TA) running inside a TEE, via remote attestation.
In addition, the addon must establish a secure channel directly with
the TA. SafeKeeper uses binary attestation to assure the addon of
the precise TA running inside the server-side TEE. To verify that
it is communicating with a genuine SafeKeeper TA, the addon veri-
fies the quote, and then checks the binary measurement against a
whitelist of known SafeKeeper TAs. Since the same TA can be used
by many websites, and the functionality of the TA is unlikely to
change, the whitelist of genuine SafeKeeper TAs will be short, and
can be built into the browser. The attestation protocol includes a key
agreement step through which the browser and the TA establish
a shared session key. Note that the attestation protocol provides
only unilateral authentication of the SafeKeeper TA towards the
client; i.e. the client software or the user is not authenticated during
attestation. Thus, anyone, including an adversary can establish a
connection and interact with the TA. However, since the key agree-
ment step is cryptographically bound to the TA’s remote attestation,
the adversary cannot perform a man-in-the-middle attack when
legitimate clients communicate with the TA.
Using the shared session key, the browser encrypts the password
before the page is submitted. The encrypted password is sent to
the server in place of the original password, and may be wrapped
in additional layers of encryption (e.g. TLS). On the server, the
encrypted password is input to the TA, which decrypts it using the
shared key and performs the cryptographic one-way function.
4.4 Client-side Assurance Mechanism
SafeKeeper’s client-side assurance mechanism can be added to exist-
ing web browsers e.g. by installing a browser addon. This addon
executes the remote attestation protocol and establishes a secure
channel with the TA. If the attestation succeeds, the addon changes
its appearance to signal this to the user (e.g. an icon in the browser
toolbar).
The server specifies in the web page which input fields should
be encrypted and sent to the SafeKeeper password protection TA.
The addon parses this information and encrypts any text entered
into these fields. However, a rogue server may specify that some
non-password fields should be protected, while the actual password
field is not protected. To prevent this, the SafeKeeper addon signals
to the user which input fields are protected by greying out the
whole page, highlighting only the text input fields it will encrypt,
and displaying an information tooltip, as shown in Figure 3.
An alternative approach would be to ask the user to designate
certain text as passwords (e.g. by requiring the user to type “@@” as
in PwdHash [37]). However, our approach was chosen in order to
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Figure 3: Top: The original webpage; Bottom: SafeKeeper
highlighting the password input field.
reduce the cognitive load on users, since they are required only to
check that the relevant input field is protected, and may also prevent
errors where users designate an incorrect field to be protected (e.g.
user ID).
Additionally, the adversary could attempt to spoof the highlight-
ing performed by SafeKeeper (e.g. by highlighting fields that are
not actually protected). To mitigate this, we use a similar principle
to a secure attention sequence by requiring the user to click on the
browser addon icon to activate the highlighting. This click cannot
be detected or prevented by the adversary (as it is outside of the
browser DOM). After the user has clicked, the SafeKeeper icon is
again changed to indicate that it is in the highlighting mode. This
provides a spoofing-resistant mechanism for signaling to the user
which input fields will be protected. The user is thus assured that
any password entered into this type of protected input field will
always be protected by SafeKeeper, regardless of the identity of the
website or the behavior of the server.
Unlike many other client-side approaches (e.g. password man-
agers), the SafeKeeper browser addon is stateless and user-agnostic.
This makes our client-side assurance mechanism a good candidate
to be integrated into future versions of web browsers. Full details of
our implementation of this mechanism are discussed in Section 5.2
and evaluated in Section 6.2.
5 IMPLEMENTATION
We have implemented a fully-functional open-source prototype of
SafeKeeper. In this section, we describe the specific implementation
challenges and our solutions.
5.1 Server-side Password Protection
Our implementation of the server-side password protection service
uses Intel’s recent Software Guard Extensions (SGX). However, Safe-
Keeper can use any equivalent TEE that provides isolated execution,
sealed storage, and remote attestation. We use SGX for its ease of
use and superior performance, and increasing prevalence on server
platforms (e.g. Intel Xeon).
init(in_sealed(key|| attempts ));
process(in(password ||salt), out(CMAC ));
reset_attempts ();
shutdown(out_sealed(key|| attempts ));
Listing 1: Password protection service enclave interface
The design of our SGX enclave is kept minimalistic, consisting
of only four ecalls; see Listing 1. When the enclave is started for
the first time, the init() uses Intel’s true random number genera-
tor (via the RDRAND instruction), to generate a new strong random
SafeKey. When the enclave is later restarted, this function is used to
pass previously-sealed data to the enclave. The process() function
calculates the keyed one-way function on the password using the
SafeKey and returns the result. We use the Rijndael-128 CMAC func-
tion, as this meets our security requirements and can be computed
using the AES-NI hardware extensions. The reset_attempts()
function forms part of our in-enclave rate-limiting mechanism. The
shutdown() function is used to perform a graceful shutdown of
the enclave (e.g. in case the server needs to reboot). This function
seals the SafeKey and the current state of the enclave.
We integrate SafeKeeper’s password protection service into the
PHPass library, which is widely used for password hashing in pop-
ular web platforms including WordPress, Joomla, and Drupal. By
default, PHPass uses a software implementation of MD5 with 256
iterations. We replaced this with a single call to our enclave, using
the PHP-CPP framework2 to invoke C/C++ enclave functions from
PHP.
5.1.1 Rate limiting. Apart from the web server’s rate limiting
(e.g. the use of Captchas after a certain number of failed attempts),
we implement the rate-limiting algorithm (Section 4.2) within the
TEE-protected password service. Our enclave program keeps an
in-memory map (using C++ std::map) that associates each salt
(i) with a number of remaining attempts (attemptsi ). To provide
maximum flexibility, our implementation uses a 64-bit salt and a 32-
bit integer for attemptsi , although this can be decreased to reduce
memory consumption if needed.
When process() is called for salt i , this function first checks the
value of attemptsi ; if the value is zero, the function returns only an
error; otherwise attemptsi is decremented by one and the CMAC
result is returned. The enclave stores tr eset , the time at which
all attempts values are reset to a predefined value, attemptsmax .
When reset_attempts() is called, this function first obtains the
current time; then, if tr eset has passed, sets all attempts values to
attemptsmax and increases tr eset by a predefined value.
Although the effective rate can be set by the enclave developer,
it is verified by the user via the browser addon, so a malicious
developer cannot set an arbitrarily high rate. In our implementation,
we use 144 attempts per 24 hours. Operations involving time make
use of the SGX trusted time API: sgx_get_trusted_time(); when
called, the platform returns the current time (with second precision)
and a platform-generated nonce. Any change in the nonce value
between two invocations of this function indicates that there may
have been an attack on the platform, and thus the returned time
2http://www.php-cpp.com
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value should not be trusted. During initiation, the SafeKeeper TA
obtains and stores this nonce in its protected memory.
To allow the enclave to be restarted (e.g. if the server is rebooted),
the shutdown() function is used to securely store the state informa-
tion outside the enclave. Specifically, the enclave seals the SafeKey,
the map of salts and attempts values, tr eset , and the time nonce.
This sealed data can be restored to the enclave via the init()
function. The enclave uses monotonic counters3 to prevent roll-
back attacks in which the adversary attempts to restore old sealed
data. When the enclave starts, the init() function increments a
hardware-backed monotonic counter. The shutdown() function
seals this counter value along with the enclave’s state. When the
enclave is restarted, this counter value is checked to ensure that
the latest sealed state is being restored.
A rogue server may attempt to reset the attempts values by
abruptly killing the enclave without first sealing its state. How-
ever, the enclave will detect this because the counter value in the
sealed data will not match the current value of the hardware mono-
tonic counter. In this case, the enclave has no way of restoring
the previous attempts values – the data has been irreversibly lost.
Therefore, the only secure course of action is to set tr eset to some
predetermined time in the future, and set all attempts to zero (i.e.
to impose the maximum penalty). This captures the worst-case sce-
nario in which the adversary had exhausted all guessing attempts
against all accounts. Note that, during normal operations, enclave
crashes should be rare, and with proper load balancing the effects
of abnormal enclave crashes can be amortized.
5.1.2 0-round-trip attestation. Remote attestation is used to as-
sure the browser that it is communicating with a genuine SafeKeeper
password protection service running inside an SGX enclave. It is
achieved by obtaining a quote from the enclave and verifying it
using the IAS. The quote includes an unforgeable representation of
the code executing inside the enclave. As described in Section 2, the
remote attestation protocol provided with the SGX SDK is designed
to provision secrets to an enclave from a trusted source, and thus
requires mutual authentication. This protocol involves four mes-
sages and two round-trips. In SafeKeeper there is no requirement for
the browser addon to authenticate itself to the enclave. Any entity
can request a quote from the enclave and then decide whether to
establish a secure channel. We thus modify the attestation protocol
to optimize it for SafeKeeper.
We denote our optimized protocol as 0-round-trip attestation
because it does not require any round-trip message exchanges be-
tween the client and server. In our protocol, the SGX signature
revocation list (SigRL) is fetched by the SafeKeeper password ser-
vice (i.e. by the server, instead of the client). Our implementation
fetches an updated list once per hour. Our enclave generates a Diffie-
Hellman (DH) key-pair and obtains an SGX quote containing the
hash of the DH public key. This binds the public key to the enclave’s
identity (i.e. its MRENCLAVE value). When a web page is requested
by a browser, the server includes the quote as an HTTP-header in
the response. The client then verifies the quote using the IAS (see
Section 5.2.1).
3https://software.intel.com/en-us/node/709160
Since the enclave prepares and obtains the quote before any
client connection, there is no overhead of generating a quote on-
demand for each client. Unlike the original protocol, our protocol
does not require the client to supply a challenge to be included in
the quote. This is because the current version of SGX measures the
enclave’s code when the enclave is initialized and then does not
allow the code to be changed. Therefore, even without a challenge,
the verifier is assured that the public key included in the quote is
fresh and belongs to the enclave.
Also unlike the original protocol, in our modified version, the
enclave does not generate a new public key for each client. Since
each client generates its own DH key-pair, the resulting keys used
to encrypt the passwords will still be completely different for each
client (i.e. no client will be able to read another’s password). One
disadvantage of this approach is that a compromise of the enclave’s
single public key could potentially reveal all encrypted passwords.
However, this could only be achieved by subverting the security
guarantees of SGX, in which case the SafeKey could also be compro-
mised and used in offline password guessing attacks. As explained
in Section 3, adversaries capable of subverting hardware-enforced
TEEs are out of scope of this work.
5.1.3 SGX remote attestation proxy. The browser addon cannot
check the quote directly because all communication with the IAS
must be performed via a mutually-authenticated TLS channel, using
a TLS client certificate that the developer has registered with Intel.4
We assume everyday users will be unable or unwilling to be regis-
tered with Intel for SafeKeeper or any such services. To overcome
this challenge, we implement an SGX remote attestation proxy. Our
proxy server accepts unilaterally-authenticated TLS connections
from verifiers (e.g. the SafeKeeper browser addon) and forwards
the contents to the IAS via the required mutually-authenticated
TLS channel. The results from the IAS are returned to the callers.
Since the IAS signs its response message and provides a certificate
chain rooted in a public Intel verification certificate, the verifiers do
not need to trust our IAS proxy. We implemented this proxy using
an Nginx5 server configured as a reverse HTTP proxy with TLS
support on both the upstream server and the incoming connections.
The TLS certificate of the proxy is pinned in the SafeKeeper browser
addon. Since the enclave uses the same public key and quote for all
clients, our proxy can cache the quote verification response from
IAS to reduce the verification latency.
5.2 Client-side Assurance Mechanism
We implement SafeKeeper’s client-side assurance mechanism as an
addon for the Google Chrome browser (similar implementations
can also be developed for the other browsers). We assume that users
can download and install this addon securely (e.g. using the Chrome
Web Store), and receive software updates when available. Note that
browser vendors are actively working to ensure the security of
browser addons.6
4https://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/certificate-requirements-for-intel-attestation-services
5https://nginx.org/en/
6https://blog.chromium.org/2015/05/continuing-to-protect-chrome-users-from.
html
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Our browser addon is written in JavaScript and consists of two
parts: (i) a background script implementing the main functional-
ity; and (ii) a content script injected into each web page in order
to interact with the page content. The addon therefore requires
permission to access tabs data, use the browser storage, and capture
and modify certain web requests.
5.2.1 Detecting the password protection service. Web servers
with SafeKeeper support will send an SGX quote in the HTTP re-
sponse header of web pages with protected fields (e.g. the login
form). This quote is processed by the addon’s background script,
which verifies the integrity of the service and the validity of the
quote. Specifically, the addon extracts from the quote the unique
hash representing the enclave’s loaded code (i.e. the MRENCLAVE
value), and checks if this is included in its list of trusted values. This
list can be updated in a similar manner to updating the browser.
If the enclave’s identity is trusted, the addon sends this quote to
the IAS, via our IAS proxy (see Section 5.1.3). Upon receiving a
response, the addon checks the result from the IAS and verifies the
signature on the response using Intel’s public IAS verification key.
If the attestation process is successful, the background script gener-
ates a new DH key pair for the website, and establishes the shared
key using the enclave’s public key. This is stored in a local variable
and also sent to the content script. Finally, the background script
changes the icon of the addon to indicate the website’s support of
SafeKeeper; see Figure 4.
Figure 4: SafeKeeper browser addon icons: the first one indi-
cates that SafeKeeper is unavailable on the website, or that
the attestation protocol has failed; the second icon shows
that SafeKeeper is supported and that a secure channel
has been established; and the third icon is used when Safe-
Keeper is highlighting the protected input fields (see Sec-
tion 5.2.2).
5.2.2 Highlighting protected input fields. When a page is loaded,
the injected content script checks for the SafeKeeper metatag. If
present, this tag specifies which input fields must be encrypted
by SafeKeeper. The content script stores this information in a local
variable.
When the user clicks the browser addon icon, a popup window
appears to provide information about the current web page; see
Figure 5. Clicking the addon icon also serves as the secure attention
sequence described in Section 4.4, as this cannot be manipulated
by the adversary-controlled web page script. This action sends a
message to the content script, which modifies the website’s DOM
elements to highlight the protected input fields. Specifically, the
content script clones the protected input fields, highlights them in
Figure 5: SafeKeeper popup windows: (1) the page supports
SafeKeeper, but the protected input fields are not currently
highlighted; (2) SafeKeeper is highlighting the protected
fields in the page.
green, and attaches an information tooltip to inform the user why
a field is highlighted. It then decreases the opacity of all the other
elements in thewebsite’s body section to ensure that the highlighted
fields stand out to the user. Cloning the protected input fields is
necessary as it is not allowed to specify a different opacity for nested
elements within the body section. When the user clicks on the icon
again, the content script increases the opacity value for all the
body elements, copies any input from the cloned fields back to the
original, and removes the clones. When the web page is submitted,
the content script encrypts all values from the protected input fields
using the shared key agreed with the SafeKeeper password service.
5.2.3 Defending against malicious client-side scripts. As defined
in our adversary model (Section 3), a malicious server operator has
the capability to modify the content of the web page, including
adding client-side scripts. This poses several threats. First, as client-
side scripts can read data from any field on the page, a malicious
script may attempt to read the password as it is typed by the user.
Client-side scripts that exhibit this behaviour for other types of
personal information have already been observed in the wild.7
With the exception of disabling the malicious script, there is no
way to avoid this using current browser addon technologies since
the script is executing in the same domain as the text input field.
Second, malicious client-side scripts can perform the same type of
highlighting of input fields as the SafeKeeper browser addon. For
example, the adversary could use this to highlight input fields that
are not actually protected. Third, although the adversary cannot
detect when the SafeKeeper highlighting has been activated, he can
add a time delay to his malicious script (e.g. 10 seconds). His aim
is to make his malicious script run after the user has clicked the
SafeKeeper icon to activate highlighting mode, in which case the
7https://gizmodo.com/before-you-hit-submit-this-company-has-already-logge-1795906081
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malicious script will change the highlighted fields while SafeKeeper
is in highlighting mode.
To mitigate these attacks, SafeKeeper provides a mechanism for
disabling all other client-side scripts on a particular website. Cur-
rently Google Chrome does not provide a direct option to disable
client-side scripts for particular websites, so we have developed an
alternative approach to provide this functionality using a Content
Security Policy (CSP). Using the toggle switch on the SafeKeeper
popup window, users can disable scripts for individual websites.
SafeKeeper then reloads the page and injects our customCSPmetatag
into the header. This CSP still allows our injected content script
to run, but prevents all other scripts from executing on the page.
A limitation of this approach is that it leads to a race condition
between the time our CSP is injected, and the loading of any other
scripts. However, our experimental evaluation showed that only
pages loaded directly from localhost were fast enough to evade
our CSP. When scripts are disabled for a particular website, the
addon stores this information in Chrome’s local storage and con-
tinues to disable scripts on future visits to this website, until the
user re-enables scripts.
However, disabling client-side scripts often negatively affects the
usability of the web page. Therefore, by default SafeKeeper allows
client-side scripts. Careful users can still turn-off all client-side
scripts manually when needed, e.g. if they are unsure about the
server’s bona fides. In Section 7, we present an alternative approach
that ensures the same level of security without disabling client-side
scripts.
6 EVALUATION
We evaluated the security, usability, performance, and deployability
of SafeKeeper.
6.1 Security Analysis
As defined in Requirement R1 (Section 3.3), a comprehensive solu-
tion for protecting passwords must (i) prevent even the strongest
adversary (i.e. a rogue server) from observing passwords in transit
or while they are being processed on the server; (ii) prevent offline
password guessing attacks; and (iii) throttle online password guess-
ing, irrespective of the adversary’s computational capabilities. We
analyse the security guarantees provided by SafeKeeper against each
of these classes of attacks, and against other attacks that may arise
from the technologies used in our implementation.
6.1.1 Passwords in transit and on the server. The secure channel,
based on the DH key agreement between the browser addon and
the enclave, ensures the confidentiality of passwords while in tran-
sit over the network, and while they are being processed on the
server, before they are input to the enclave. Since this channel is
cryptographically bound to the enclave’s remote attestation quote,
the client-side software is assured that it is communicating with the
correct enclave. Note that, this channel’s security is independent of
any other layer, such as TLS, established between the browser and
web server. As such, password confidentiality remains unaffected
even if there are flaws in TLS/HTTPS protocols (e.g. [4, 38]).
6.1.2 Offline guessing. In an offline attack, the adversary would
attempt to guess the password and test his guess directly against the
password database (e.g. leaked password hash databases), bypassing
any online guessing prevention by the web server. The adversary
is therefore not subject to rate-limiting, and can perform guesses at
the maximum rate supported by his available hardware. However,
to test these guesses, the adversary must also guess the SafeKey
used in the CMAC calculation, and thus making offline attacks
infeasible even against very weak passwords.
6.1.3 Online guessing. To avoid having to guess the SafeKey, a
malicious server operator could perform an online attack by sub-
mitting password guesses to the SafeKeeper password protection
service, running in the SGX enclave. However, the adversary’s
rate of guessing is then constrained by SafeKeeper’s rate-limiting
mechanism described in Section 5.1.1. This effectively increases the
difficulty of guessing the password by increasing the time required.
For example, an average strength password is estimated to provide
approximately 20 bits of entropy [9], so if SafeKeeper’s effective
maximum rate is set to 144 authentication attempts per day, the av-
erage time required to guess this password (i.e. 219 guesses) would
be approximately 10 years. Note that even this type of rate limiting
cannot protect very weak passwords for long (e.g. short passwords
or those that appear in lists of frequently used passwords). This is
a fundamental limitation of password-based authentication.
Even though our rate limiting is based on the salt, which is
under the adversary’s control, the adversary cannot increase his
guessing rate by manipulating the choice of salts. For example,
if the adversary chooses the same salt for all accounts, he can
test his guesses against all passwords in the database (e.g. 144
guesses per day, tested against all accounts). However, if he chooses
unique salts he can test the same number of guesses against each
individual account, and possibly vary guesses between accounts
(e.g. 144 guesses per day against each account). Additionally, he may
try to add fake accounts with guessed passwords to leverage the
fact that the same passwords will result in the same CMAC values,
if a global salt is used. However, as passwords of new accounts must
also be processed by the SafeKeeper password protection service,
the number of guessing attempts per day remains unaffected. An
external adversary (i.e. without compromising the web server) will
also be restricted by any online guessing prevention mechanisms
(e.g. Captcha) implemented by an honest server operator.
6.1.4 Implementation-specific attacks. In addition to the main
classes of attacks discussed above, we also analyse attacks that may
arise as a result of the specific technologies used in our implemen-
tation.
Roll-back attacks: As explained in Section 5.1.1, our implementa-
tion can detect roll-back attacks on sealed data, using the platform’s
hardware-backed monotonic counters. It can also detect and pe-
nalize any attempts to circumvent this protection (e.g. crashing
the enclave). While the enclave is running, all enclave data (even
that paged out of the EPC) enjoys automatic roll-back protection
provided by the CPU [22].
Run-time attacks: Remote attestation ensures that the SafeKeeper
enclave was started from trustworthy executable code. However,
if an adversary finds vulnerabilities in this code, he may attempt
to mount run-time attacks. The SafeKeeper enclave itself contains
only 248 lines of C code, excluding the Intel SDK. We assume the
SDK code is not vulnerable to run-time attacks, or at least has been
9
thoroughly audited since it is commonly used by all SGX enclaves.
Therefore, SafeKeeper’s small size reduces the likelihood of vulner-
abilities that could lead to runtime attacks, and makes SafeKeeper
amenable to security audits or even formal code verification.
Side-channel attacks: Various side-channel attacks have been
demonstrated against SGX (e.g. [42, 45]). The SafeKeeper enclave
must protect four types of assets: (i) the plaintext user password;
(ii) the SafeKey; (iii) the channel keys resulting from the DH key
agreement; and (iv) the DH private values. When performing any
AES-based operations (e.g. computing a CMAC value, or decrypt-
ing a password using the channel key), the SafeKeeper enclave uses
hardware AES-NI instructions, which are not vulnerable to soft-
ware side-channel attacks8 including the cache timing attack by
Götzfried et al. [21] against a software AES implementation. When
performing the DH key agreement, SafeKeeper uses Intel’s trusted
key exchange functions, which, to the best of our knowledge have
not been shown to be vulnerable to side-channel attacks.
6.2 Usability Evaluation
As part of evaluating SafeKeeper against our Requirement R2, we
conducted a user study for the client-side browser addon. The
primary objectives of this study include: (i) quantify the ability of
participants to use the addon correctly; (ii) assess the memorability
of the addon usage after a period of disuse; and (iii) analyse the
difficulty of using the addon. This user study was carried out in
accordance with the standard practices of our institution. No data
protection issues arose because participants were not asked to use
or disclose any sensitive personal data.
6.2.1 Participants and methodology. We recruited 86 partici-
pants using institutional mailing lists and social media. The par-
ticipants were randomly split into two groups: main study group
(64 participants), and control group (22 participants). We collected
basic demographic and background information for the main study
group: 70% of participants were male and 30% were female; ages
between 18 to 39 years; participants’ educational qualification: 2%
Ph.D. 34% Master’s, 41% Bachelor’s, 9% High school diploma (14%
unspecified).
Main Group: Each participant in this group was initially shown
the SafeKeeper information page, which contains the same informa-
tion a normal user would see when installing our browser addon.
Participants were then given a set of 25 websites. These websites
were clones of popular websites, created usingHTTrack9 and hosted
on an internal institutional server. We slightly modified these sites
for our experiment; see Table 1. Out of the 25 websites, 9 used Safe-
Keeper to protect the user’s password, but 5 of these also spoofed
the SafeKeeper UI on some other input field in an attempt to confuse
users. Of the 16 websites that did not protect the password, 4 used
SafeKeeper to protect a non-password input field while showing the
addon icon; 10 websites spoofed the UI to highlight the password
field, and 3 of these spoofed the UI after a time delay (i.e. the attack
explained in Section 5.2.3). The order in which the websites were
listed was the same for all participants, but participants could access
these in any sequence and had the option to return to previous
websites. We did not inform participants anything about spoofing.
8https://software.intel.com/en-us/node/709048
9https://www.httrack.com/
Table 1: Test websites
SafeKeeper
lock icon
Password
protected
Spoofing types # tests
✓ ✓ None 4
✓ ✓ Other input fields highlighted 5
✗ ✗ None 6
✗ ✗ Password field highlighted 3
✓ ✗ Password field highlighted 4
✗ ✗ Password field highlighted af-
ter delay
3
For each website, participants were asked: “Does this website pro-
tect your password using SafeKeeper?” Participants were instructed
not to enter any password or other information on the website,
but simply to record their answer on the provided paper form. The
available options were: Yes, No, and the level of certainty of the
answer, ranging from 1 (least certain) to 4 (most certain). In order
to assess the statistical significance of our results, we assumed a
null hypothesis in which participants guess either Yes or No in
a uniformly random manner. Under this null hypothesis, the ef-
fectiveness would therefore be 50%. We assumed the standard 5%
threshold value for statistical significance (α = 0.05).
Follow-up Study: After two months, we invited 20 participants
with the highest scores (in terms of successfully identifying Safe-
Keeper protection) in the initial study to participate in a follow-up
study. The objective of this study was to measure how well the
participants remembered how to use SafeKeeper, after a relatively
long period of disuse. The procedure was the same as for the ini-
tial study, except that participants were not shown the original
SafeKeeper information page, and were not reminded of the instruc-
tions for using SafeKeeper. They were asked to visit the same set of
websites in a different order and to answer the same question.
Control Group: To obtain a baseline against which to assess the
results of the follow-up study, we invited approximately the same
number of participants (22) to use the tool without any instructions.
This was the same procedure as the follow-up study, except that this
control group had never previously used the addon. This control
group is therefore the best approximation of the scenario in which
users have completely forgotten how to use SafeKeeper.
6.2.2 Results. In the main group, participants correctly identi-
fied 86.81% of websites. The average level of certainty per website
varied from 3.5 to 4. Calculating the p-value for each participant
(across all websites) showed that for 80% of participants, p < 0.001.
The p-value for each website (across all participants) does not ex-
ceed 0.001 for 88% of websites.
In the initial study, the top 20 participants correctly identified
93% of websites on average. In the follow-up study, they correctly
identified 91% of websites on average. Calculating the p-value for
each participant using McNemar’s test shows that for 95% of par-
ticipants, the p-value exceeds 0.2. This means that there was no
statistically significant decrease in the effectiveness of SafeKeeper
after two months of disuse. The p-value of only one participant
shows a statistically significant decrease in effectiveness.
Even with no instructions, the control group participants cor-
rectly identified 74% of websites on average. Using Fisher’s exact
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test to compare the follow-up group to the control group resulted
in p = 6.4 × 10−14 (far smaller than the threshold of 0.05), showing
that the difference is statistically significant.
6.2.3 Discussion. Achieving almost 87% effectiveness, we have
exceeded the percentage indicated in the null hypothesis, provid-
ing evidence of the addon’s utility. Out of 64 participants in the
main group, only for 5, p > 0.05. Among the 25 websites, only
for one website, p > 0.05 (the first phishing website participants
encountered).
The follow-up study indicates that the effectiveness with which
users use SafeKeeper may not diminish, even after long periods
of disuse (only one out of 20 participants showed a statistically
significant drop in effectiveness).
Surprisingly, the control group managed to use the browser
addon without any instructions to correctly identify a relatively
high number of websites. We suspect that these participants may
have inferred the instructions to a certain extent based on the
addon’s behaviour and the text displayed in the popup window
(Figure 5).
Based on the data gathered from the background questionnaires,
nearly 58% of participants reported that they do not usually check
for a secure connection while browsing the web. 75% of participants
were aware of phishing. When asked to assess the level of difficulty
of using SafeKeeper, participants answers were: “very easy to use”
(39%), “easy to use” (55%), “difficult to use” (6%), “very difficulty
to use” (0%). Overall, 76% of participants said they would like to
use SafeKeeper in their own browsers. However, five participants
mentioned that they would not use SafeKeeper since they are “not
concerned about the security of passwords.” Nine participants in-
dicated that they would like to know more about the underlying
technology.
6.3 Performance Evaluation
Using the implementation described in Section 5, we evaluated the
memory consumption and scalability of our server-side password
protection service, as well as the latency of verifying a quote with
the IAS via our attestation proxy. All reported performance mea-
surements are the average of 10 trials, using a simulated password
database of 1 million active unique users (i.e. 1 million unique salt
values), performed on an Intel Core i5-6500 3.20 GHz CPU with
8GB of RAM.
Memory consumption: Our enclave required at most 110 MB of
heap memory to store an in-memory rate-limiting map containing
all 1 million salt values. Although this may exceed the available
EPC size on some platforms, SGX supports paging of EPC pages, so
the number of users that can be supported by a single platform is
limited only by the platform’s total available memory. As discussed
in Section 5.1.1, memory consumption could be reduced by using
more compact representations of the salt or counter values. Note
that the enclave does not have to store the salts of every user in the
database at the same time – it only stores salts it has processed in
the current time window (e.g. users who authenticated in the past
24 hours). The memory consumption can thus be further decreased
by reducing this time window (e.g. setting the rate to 36 attempts
per 6 hours would only require storing salts for the past 6 hours).
Scalability: To measure the performance of the server when
multiple users attempt to authenticate concurrently, we instru-
mented PHPass to measure the maximum password processing
rate. With the default hash function (software MD5, 256 iterations),
the maximum rate is 446 (±10) passwords/second. With the Safe-
Keeper password protection service, the rate increases to 1653 (±70)
passwords/second, since we do not require multiple iterations. We
also measured the raw performance of the enclave without PHP
(e.g. for websites running optimized software): the maximum rate is
101,337 (±4186) passwords/second. Therefore, even for high-volume
websites, this is unlikely to be a performance bottleneck.
Latency: The average latency of verifying a quote with the IAS
via our attestation proxy is 866 ms (±25 ms), average over 10 trials).
If the connection to the proxy is re-used (e.g. when the user opens
a new tab in the same browser window), this decreases to 296 ms
(±5 ms). This quote verification can be done asynchronously by
the SafeKeeper browser addon while the web page loads, and the
latency is comparable with the typical loading time of the web page,
this may not have any noticeable impact on the user’s browsing
experience.
6.4 Deployability Evaluation
Minimal software changes: SafeKeeper’s server-side password protec-
tion service is designed to be a drop-in replacement for the one-way
functions used in current password hashing frameworks (e.g. the
PHPass library). Integrating the password protection service into
the PHPass library required adding one line of code to initialize the
enclave, and changing three lines of code in the password process-
ing function.
Existing servers using the PHPass library for password hash-
ing can be gradually migrated to SafeKeeper. First, the necessary
hardware support should be added to provide the SGX TEE. Next,
the PHPass library is updated to the SafeKeeper version. Then all
password hashes in the existing database are input to the SafeKeeper
enclave, which produces new hash values that are stored in the data-
base. This results in a so-called onion hash in which the password
is first hashed by the original PHPass library function, and then the
result is processed by the SafeKeeper password protection service.
This approach allows the server upgrade to be completed without
requiring users to log-in or provide their passwords. Finally, the
web pages should be annotated to specify which fields are protected
by SafeKeeper. This process is transparent to end users and requires
only small changes on the server side.
7 EXTENSIONS AND VARIATIONS
In this section, we propose several extensions and variations of
SafeKeeper for other use-cases.
7.1 Backup and Recovery
In real-world deployments, server hardware sometimes fails. With-
out an adequate backup and recovery procedure, failure of SGX
hardware would result in loss of the SafeKey, forcing all users to
change their passwords. A simple backup protocol would be to
copy the SafeKey to a type of backup enclave running on a different
physical machine. Using remote attestation, the primary SafeKeeper
enclave could ensure that the SafeKey was entrusted to a legitimate
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backup enclave. If the primary enclave fails, the backup enclave
could restore the SafeKey to a new SafeKeeper enclave, after attesting
the new enclave. However, this naive protocol could be abused to
subvert the online guessing rate-limiting mechanism: the adversary
could restore the SafeKey to another machine, or even to multiple
machines, even if the primary had not failed, thus increasing his
effective guessing rate.
To prevent this attack, SafeKeeper uses a backup and recovery
protocol based on unanimous approval of all key-holding enclaves.
Initially, the only key-holding enclave is the primary enclave p0,
since it generated the SafeKey. To create a backup, a SafeKeeper
backup enclave b0 is launched on a separate physical machine, and
attested by p0 (e.g. the MRENCLAVE value of valid backup enclaves
could be hard-coded into p0). If the attestation succeeds, p0 estab-
lishes a secure channel to b0 and sends it the SafeKey, and a list of
all current key-holding enclaves {p0,b0}, signed by p0. A correct
backup enclave bi will only accept the SafeKey if it is accompanied
by matching signed lists from all key-holding enclaves, and all lists
include bi . Similarly, a new primary enclave pi will only accept
a SafeKey if it is accompanied by matching signed lists from all
key-holding enclaves that all designate pi as the primary enclave.
Since the enclaves themselves are guaranteed to behave correctly,
this maintains the invariant that all key-holding enclaves are aware
of all other key-holding enclaves. If an enclave does not receive all
the required signed lists, it will not do anything.
However, if a machine fails, its enclave can no longer provide an
updated list in order to change the set of key-holding enclaves. In
this case, the operator can provide all other key-holding enclaves
with a proof that the failed machine has been revoked (e.g. a signed
assertion from Intel). All key-holding enclaves can safely remove
the failed machine (either a primary or backup) from their lists. For
example, if p0 fails and is revoked, b0 can update its list to {b0}. A
new primary enclave p1 can be created and attested by b0, which
then sends p1 the SafeKey and an updated list {p1,b0} signed by b0,
thus allowing p1 to start operating.
In terms of security, the adversary can always prevent one or
more enclaves from providing such lists, but this only leads to denial
of service, which does not threaten the security of the passwords.
An enclave that has not actually failed can still be revoked by a
malicious operator (e.g. in order to activate a new primary concur-
rently). To prevent this, each enclave checks whether it has been
revoked (e.g. whenever the reset_attempts() function is called).
This protocol also allows multiple backups to be created b0, ...bn ,
thus improving redundancy whilst still maintaining the invariant.
In the example above, if p1 wants to make a second backup b1, the
process is the same except that b1 must receive two lists of the form
{p1,b0,b1}, signed by p1 and b0. Although users only attest the
primary enclave, they can transitively trust the backup enclaves,
because these have been attested by the primary. The code used to
attest the backup enclaves is included in the quote of the primary,
which is checked by the users.
7.2 Scaling to Multiple Servers
Although our performance evaluation shows that SafeKeeper is un-
likely to be a performance bottleneck even for high-volume web-
sites, a website operator may still wish to run SafeKeeper’s password
protection service on multiple physical machines (e.g. in different
geographic locations to reduce latency). Similarly to the backup
and recovery protocol, simply duplicating the primary enclave on
another machine would increase the adversary’s rate of guessing,
as he could guess on both primaries.
To support secure scaling to multiple servers, the backup and
recovery protocol described above can be extended to supportmulti-
ple concurrent primaries. The overall permissible password checking
rate is divided among the primaries. The rate of each primary is
included in the list of key-holding enclaves, and all enclaves must
check that the sum of these rates equals the predefined total rate
(i.e. 144 guesses per 24 hours in our implementation). For example,
with two concurrent primaries p0 and p1, and one backup enclave
b0, the list of all key-holders would be {p0 = 72,p1 = 72,b0}. If
primary p0 now fails, p1 and b0 could remove it from their lists after
receiving the signed revocation statement. The rate of p1 could then
be increased if b0 signs the list {p1 = 144,b0}.
As in the backup and recovery protocol, increasing the rate of any
primary requires unanimous approval of all key-holding enclaves.
However, decreasing the rate of any enclave (even down to zero)
does not require any approval (i.e. an enclave decreases its own rate
before signing a new list that would cause its rate to decrease). If
the decrease operation required unanimous approval, the adversary
might simply block some of the messages in order to maintain the
higher rate. In this way, the overall rate still cannot increase beyond
the maximum, but also does not decrease in the event of hardware
failures.
To simplify the implementation and the attestation of enclaves,
there is no difference between a primary enclave and a backup
enclave in our design – backup enclaves are just primary enclaves
with a rate of zero. This means that even in the simplest scenario of
one primary and one backup, the backup can automatically become
a primary and start processing requests as soon as the original
primary fails.
7.3 Protecting Email Address Confidentiality
Many websites use email as a password reset mechanism e.g. a pass-
word reset token can be sent to the user’s registered email address.
However, this requires the server to store users’ email addresses,
which could lead to abuse by a malicious server operator (e.g. spam-
ming the user) or the email addresses could be leaked through a
data breach. If the email address is only needed for password re-
covery, a variant of SafeKeeper can protect it against unauthorized
disclosure, even by a malicious server operator or an adversary
who compromises the server. This variant may also be useful for
other similar privacy-sensitive information.
As shown in Figure 6, this makes use of a new server-side com-
ponent, the SafeKeeper email protection service (these TAs can be
merged if needed). Like the password protection service, this com-
ponent is also isolated using a TEE. The email protection service
is used during user registration, and password reset, however, the
behaviour of the service is the same in both cases. When the user
registers, her email address is encrypted by SafeKeeper’s client-side
software in the same way as a password, and is sent to the email
protection TA ❶. The TA decrypts and then computes a keyed
one-way function of the email address, and outputs the result to the
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Figure 6: Overview of the design of the email protection ser-
vice.
server, which stores it in a database. If email ownership verification
is required (indicated by the web server), the email service generates
a random nonce corresponding to the email address, and outputs
this to the server❷. The email protection service then establishes a
secure connection to a trustworthy third party email provider (e.g.
ProtonMail10), and sends the nonce to the user via email❸. The TA
establishes a secure connection to the third party email provider
(e.g. using the TaLoS TLS library [3] or the Intel SGX SSL crypto
library11) so that the email address is not revealed to the server.
Upon receiving this email, the user visits the registration web page
hosted on the server and provides the random nonce she received
via email to prove ownership ❹. To improve usability, the nonce
could be encoded into the verification URL (e.g. like an existing
password reset link).
When a user forgets her password, the process is similar, and
the functionality of the email protection service is unchanged. The
user sends her email address to the email protection service, which
computes the same keyed one-way function and outputs the result
to the server. The server checks whether that particular result is
already in its database (i.e. if the user has actually registered). If not,
the server returns an error to the user, but if the address is valid,
the untrusted server asks the email protection service to proceed
with ownership verification. If verification is successful, the user
is allowed to reset her password (via SafeKeeper). This works for
web sites that require the user to re-enter her email address in the
password reset process. For web sites that allow password reset
based only on user ID, an alternative design would be for SafeKeeper
to seal (i.e. encrypt) the email addresses during registration and
then unseal them when a password reset is required. Using this
extension does not preclude websites from using the email address
as the user ID – from the website’s perspective, the user ID simply
becomes the result of the one-way function applied to the email
address.
Note: This process does not prevent a rogue server from changing
users’ passwords without the users’ consent – this is already possi-
ble because the adversary can execute arbitrary code on the server.
10https://protonmail.com/
11https://github.com/01org/intel-sgx-ssl
Figure 7: An alternative popupwindowwith embedded pass-
word input field.
Our goal is only to protect the confidentiality of users’ passwords
and email addresses.
This type of construction could also be used to protect other types
of sensitive credentials. For example, users’ phone numbers could
be protected in the same way by establishing a secure connection
between the SafeKeeper enclave and a trustworthy voice-over-IP
(VoIP) provider, thus allowing the enclave to e.g. initiate a call to
users and play a pre-recorded audio message. Similarly, payment
card details could be protected by establishing a secure connection
from the SafeKeeper enclave to payment card providers. However,
the full design of these solutions is out of scope for this paper.
7.4 Another Defence Against Malicious Scripts
Section 5.2.3 outlined the threats posed by malicious client-side
scripts, and the challenges faced in mitigating these (i.e. possible
race conditions, and reducedweb page functionality). An alternative
to disabling scripts is to take password input directly through a
SafeKeeper controlled popup window; see Figure 7. Text entered into
this field is always encrypted and sent directly to the SafeKeeper
TA; malicious scripts at the client cannot spoof input fields or
read the typed passwords with this design. The challenge is to
teach users to enter passwords only into the SafeKeeper window.
Also, this prevents legitimate client-side scripts from reading the
password (e.g. evaluating password strength, or enforcing password
complexity policies). To maximize usability and deployability, this
variant should be optional (e.g. activated on-demand by a button in
the popup window).
7.5 No Click Required
We currently require users to check for SafeKeeper protected fields
by clicking on an icon (recall Figure 4). To alleviate this restriction,
we propose another variant to show the SafeKeeper lock symbol
only when all fields of a given page are protected. This may require
some changes to the website so that users are shown a dedicated
password entry page containing only the password input field.
However, some major websites already use this pattern (e.g. the
Google sign-in page). Alternatively, if there are multiple input fields
on the page, it may be possible to route all data through the enclave
and have the enclave release only non-sensitive data to the server.
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However, this would require an automated method for the enclave
to distinguish between passwords and non-sensitive data, which is
beyond the scope of our current work. In any case, the benefit of this
approach is that the user only has to check for the presence of the
correct SafeKeeper icon before entering a password, similar to the
HTTPS lock icon. We envision that browser vendors may integrate
SafeKeeper availability (or TEE-based protection in general) into
browser GUI, potentially within the existing HTTPS indicators.
8 RELATEDWORK
Password research has a rich history. Here we focus on proposals
that improve password security against password database compro-
mises, emphasizing solutions that leverage hardware-based security
enhancements such as Intel SGX. However, to the best of our knowl-
edge, no previous work has considered password confidentiality
against rogue servers.
To mitigate offline guessing attacks against hashed passwords,
e.g. due to password database breaches, several proposals take ad-
vantage of SGX enclaves [5, 11, 30]. These proposals either encrypt
or calculate an HMAC of the password inside an enclave in order
to protect the secret key. However, they all assume a significantly
weaker adversary model in which the server operator is trusted.
Specifically, they do not consider the confidentiality of passwords
on the server before they are input to the enclave, nor the possibility
for a malicious server operator to perform a brute-force guessing
attack using the enclave, nor the risk of phishing. SafeKeeper goes
beyond these solutions by resisting rogue servers and phishing
attacks.
Various non-SGX server-side approaches have been proposed.
Facebook uses a remote password service [19] that computes a keyed
one-way function on the password and returns the result. The secret
key used in this function never leaves their service. Even if an
adversary obtains the (keyed) password repository, he must guess
the secret key, or connect to the Facebook remote password service
(easy to detect and rate-limit). However, running such a service and
protecting the key sever against attacksmay be infeasible, especially
with a limited budget. Also, the key service must be trusted (e.g.
not to collude with an attacker), but the trustworthiness of the key
server cannot be validated by users.
Another server-side approach is to use specialized hardware to
establish an isolated execution environment. Cvrcek et al. [14] use
a custom-built USB device to store a secret key and use this to calcu-
late HMACs of passwords. Without the USB device, calculating the
HMACs is not possible, and thus cracking passwords from leaked
tags is also infeasible. Their prototype was capable of computing
only 330 HMAC tags per minute, although scalability could be im-
proved using multiple USB devices. However, plaintext passwords
remain available to the server operator, and the trustworthiness of
the USB device cannot be validated by users.
As an alternative software-only server-side approach, PolyPass-
wordHasher [41] uses a special set of protector account passwords
to prevent offline dictionary attacks against the rest of the shielded
account passwords. For protected accounts, it applies an XOR func-
tion to a share and the hash of a salted password. The share values
are derived using a threshold cryptosystem, and stored only in
memory (in plaintext). The result of the XOR operation is stored
in a database on the web server. To guess shielded passwords, the
adversary must crack a threshold of protector passwords (e.g. 3–5),
and collect the corresponding shares. The shielded passwords are
encrypted using a secret, not the shares, and then stored in the data-
base. Therefore, the shielded accounts that use weaker passwords
will not leak the information about the shares. The security of this
solution highly depends on the passwords chosen by the protectors
(e.g. admin accounts).
Users often remain logged into multiple services at the same time.
This fact is leveraged in SAuth [28] to detect password database
compromise. A login attempt to a target site must be validated
by a separate vouching site (e.g. to log into Gmail, the user must
be logged into Facebook). Thus, an attacker who compromises
passwords from one site, will be unable to use them, unless he can
also compromise passwords from the vouching site (assumed to be
unlikely).
Shirvanian et al. [39] designed SPHINX to restrict attacks on
password managers. It is based on a new cryptographic primitive
called device-enhanced password-authenticated key exchange (DE-
PAKE [26]), and uses a unique randomized password for each site;
the user memorizes only a master password. The master password
and site passwords remain safe under a compromised/malicious
server-operator or manager component (implemented on a smart-
phone or as an online service), but not under compromise of both.
If a site password and the manager are compromised, an offline
attack on the master password is possible (and consequently, other
site passwords can also be derived). Unlike in SafeKeeper, a plaintext
site password remains available to the site operator.
Online password manager Dashlane has partnered with Intel
to enable SGX protection to user passwords by locally sealing the
user’s password database [16]. This will prevent guessing attacks
even if the database is compromised from Dashlane. As of writing
(August 2017), SGX support is yet to be implemented, and it is un-
clear how such protected password be accessed from other devices.
Intel also provides an independent open-source local password
manager.12
Password database compromise in the case of password man-
agers (especially for online managers) is far more devastating than
a single site compromise. Several solutions have been proposed
recently, including attacks against them; see e.g. [8, 12, 20, 27]. In
general, these solutions rely on decoy passwords (generated fol-
lowing realistic password patterns). After a trial decryption of a
password vault, an attacker cannot readily distinguish if the can-
didate password list is real or decoy, unless he contacts an online
service (which can be detected). Attacks against these solutions
(e.g. [34]) generally exploit differences in real and decoy passwords,
leveraging limitations in decoy password generation.
Several client-side techniques have also been proposed. As an
example, the PwdHash [37] browser addon applies a pseudorandom
function to the concatenation of a password and a salt, on the client
side. The salt is generated based on a website domain, which helps
to bind the password to the specific website. However, an adversary
who compromises the web server knows the domain name, and
can therefore include this when mounting a brute-force guessing
attack.
12https://github.com/IntelSoftware/Tutorial-Password-Manager-with-Intel-SGX
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Compared to existing work, SafeKeeper provides additional secu-
rity features, including: protecting password confidentiality against
a malicious server operator, strict password guess rate-limiting from
within our enclave, enabling users to validate SGX protections of
their passwords via browser UI, and relatively easy deployment
options for server operators.
9 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
Passwords are likely to remain the de facto approach for authenti-
cating users on the web, despite their inherent security weaknesses.
Therefore, it is critical to improve the security of such systems
without decreasing performance, usability, or deployability. A com-
prehensive solution must address the dual threats of phishing and
theft of password databases, even in the case of rogue servers. We
have demonstrated that SafeKeeper is a significant step towards
meeting these objectives.
As future work, we plan to implement selected extensions and
variations, as described in Section 7. We also plan to integrate
SafeKeeper’s client-side assurance mechanism into other types of
client-side software, beyond the web browser. For example, Safe-
Keeper could be integrated with client-side password managers,
such as Dashlane [16]. The password manager itself could attest the
server-side password protection service, and agree on a session key,
without relying on the browser addon. In this way, the password
manager could encrypt the password with the session key before it
is entered into the web page, thus preventing the password from
being snooped by malicious client-side scripts. Furthermore, if the
password manager uses a TEE on the client (e.g. as planned in
Dashlane [16]), the key agreement and encryption could be done
inside the client’s TEE. This would protect the confidentiality of the
user’s passwords against rogue servers and malicious client-side
software.
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